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Abstract
Spectrograms — time-frequency representations of audio sig-
nals — have found widespread use in neural network-based
spoofing detection. While deep models are trained on the full-
band spectrum of the signal, we argue that not all frequency
bands are useful for these tasks. In this paper, we systematically
investigate the impact of different subbands and their impor-
tance on replay spoofing detection on two benchmark datasets:
ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 and ASVspoof 2019 PA. We propose a
joint subband modelling framework that employs n different
sub-networks to learn subband specific features. These are
later combined and passed to a classifier and the whole net-
work weights are updated during training. Our findings on
the ASVspoof 2017 dataset suggest that the most discrimina-
tive information appears to be in the first and the last 1 kHz
frequency bands, and the joint model trained on these two sub-
bands shows the best performance outperforming the baselines
by a large margin. However, these findings do not generalise on
the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset. This suggests that the datasets
available for training these models do not reflect real world re-
play conditions suggesting a need for careful design of datasets
for training replay spoofing countermeasures.
1. Introduction
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) [1] systems, similar to
other biometric modalities, are prone to being intentionally
fooled using spoofing attacks [2] (or presentation attacks [3]),
such as replay, text-to-speech (TTS), and voice conversion
(VC). High-stakes ASV applications demand trustworthy fail-
safe mechanisms (countermeasures) against such attacks. Here,
a countermeasure (CM) is defined as a binary classifier that
aims at discriminating bonafide (human speech) utterances from
spoofing attacks. To allow maximum re-usability across differ-
ent applications, the ideal CM should generalize across environ-
ments, speakers, languages, channels, and attacks. In practice,
this is not the case; CMs are prone to overfitting. This could
be due to variations within the spoof class (e.g. speech synthe-
sizers not present in the training set), within the bonafide class
(e.g. due to content and speaker), or extrinsic nuisance factors
(e.g. background noise).
We focus on feature extraction for audio spoofing attack
detection. There is a vast body of prior research on develop-
ing and enhancing different low-level feature extractors (most
relevant work is reviewed in Section 2), some of them obtain-
ing very low spoof-bonafide detection error rates (even 0%) on
specific datasets. Many of these techniques leverage domain
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(a) Baseline. Traditional CNN model trained on the fullband spectrum.
(b) Proposed framework. (i) The original spectrogram is split into n
sub-spectrograms on which n independent CNNs are trained. (ii) uses
pretrained weights from (i) to initialise n subband CNNs and the whole
network weights are updated during training.
Figure 1: Proposed subband CNN modeling framework.
knowledge, whether speech science (speech production or per-
ception), signal processing theory, or both. A potential ben-
efit of such rationale is transparency and interpretability. At
the same time, feature extractors crafted with the aid of domain
knowledge might be too simplistic. As illustrated in Figure 1
(b), we aim at hitting a suitable balance between hand-crafted
and data-driven feature extraction: we use spectrograms (a
meaningful representation of audio), processed in disjoint sub-
bands (to divide-and-conquer high-dimensional spectrogram
modeling across several, frequency-localized models, each han-
dling a lower-dimensional feature space), each modeled with a
convolutional neural network to learn band-specific features.
The subband-specific features are concatenated to form feature
vectors that are then classified with a feedforward neural net-
work.
The general idea of processing a power spectrogram in sub-
bands, as such, is not new in the speech field. Mel-frequency
cepstral coefficients (MFCCs) are extracted using a filterbank
consisting of frequency-localized subbands and subband-based
modeling of speaker traits dates at least two decades back [4].
In conventional, or fullband models, one trains a single model
(with a large number of parameters) using a descriptor of the
fullband spectrum. In subband based models, the rationale is to
instead divide-and-conquer the task across independently mod-
eled subbands which are later recombined using feature or score
fusion techniques. The potential benefits include the possibility
to side-step the ‘curse of dimensionality’ by using a set of mod-
els trained on lower-dimensional inputs, to achieve robustness
to frequency-selective noise, and the possibility to analyze the
importance (contribution) of each subband to the classification
results. To this end, we summarise the main contributions of
our work below.
• We perform a systematic study on different subbands and
their contribution in replay spoofing detection using con-
volutional neural networks (CNNs).
• We propose a CNN-based subband modelling frame-
work (Figure 1 (b)) that offers substantial improvement
over traditional fullband modelling (Section 5).
• We study the effect of late fusion of subband CNNs using
linear and weighted linear sum fusion approaches.
• Finally, we study the generalisability of all our replay
spoofing countermeasures on the ASVspoof 2019 “real”
PA test dataset.
2. Relation to prior work
Since the release of publicly available benchmark datasets
[5, 6, 7], there is a substantial body of prior research on var-
ious types of spoofing countermeasures; refer to [8] for a re-
cent survey. The front-end processing part of spoofing coun-
termeasures relies heavily on hand-crafted signal processing
techniques. Besides the now-standard Constant Q cepstral co-
efficients (CQCCs) [9] (and extensions, e.g. [10]), there are
methods leveraging from modulation domain processing (e.g.
[11, 12, 13]), adaptive filterbanks [14], restricted Boltzmann
machines [15], and envelopes of subband signals [16] to name a
few. In this work, we focus on modeling spectral subbands ob-
tained through a standard windowed discrete Fourier transform.
There are some research works investigating the impact of
subbands on model performance in different tasks. For instance,
the authors in [4] used a subband approach to extract relevant
features, each modeled using Gaussians. Authors in [17] inves-
tigated dependencies of different frequency bands and speaker
characteristics in a speech signal for speaker verification appli-
cations. Recently, authors in [18] demonstrated improved per-
formance using different subbands for building acoustic scene
classification models. They use a sub-spectrogram, obtained by
cropping a mel-spectrogram at different bands, to train a convo-
lutional neural network (CNN) for learning band-specific fea-
tures. This is closely related to our work. One notable differ-
ence, however, is that we do not use overlapping bands. Fur-
thermore, this approach has never been applied for spoofing de-
tection tasks.
In the context of spoofing detection, the most relevant stud-
ies include [19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. The authors of [19] investi-
gated different subbands to find the most informative bands use-
ful for spoofing detection tasks. Using the Kullback-Leibler di-
vergence (at model-level) and classification-level analysis, they
identified 0-1 kHz, 2.5-5.5 kHz and 7-8 kHz as the most infor-
mative subbands on their dataset (SAS corpus). Features were
then extracted from these bands to train a classifier (Gaussian
mixture model — universal background model), demonstrating
improved performance over traditional fullband models. The
authors of [20] investigated the importance of different sub-
bands for spoofing detection on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset.
They extracted five different types of features from these sub-
bands to train a GMM back-end classifier. They found the
high frequency range of 6-8 kHz to be the most informative.
The authors of [21] similarly performed subband analysis us-
ing CQCC and MFCC features for replay spoofing detection on
the ASVspoof 2017 dataset, with similar findings to those in
[20]. The high frequency band (6-8 kHz) provides particularly
relevant information for replay attack detection on this dataset.
The authors in [22] proposed high-frequency cepstral coeffi-
cient (HFCC) features extracted from a high-frequency spec-
trum (above 3.5 kHz). They combined HFCCs with CQCCs
and trained a deep neural network as a feature extractor. A
support vector machine classifier was trained on deep features,
outperforming the baseline GMM models on the ASVspoof
2017 dataset. The authors of [24] trained a subband autoen-
coder (SBAE) for feature extraction by restricting connections
between units in the input and the first hidden layer of the en-
coder. Doing so allows the model to learn band-specific features
useful in spoofing detection, demonstrating substantial gain in
detection performance on the ASVspoof 2015 dataset. Another
line of study that investigates subbands for spoofing detection is
[23]. Using the subbands that provide discriminative informa-
tion, they design new filters for feature extraction. Experimental
results on the ASVspoof 2017 v1.0 dataset indicate that the 0-1
and 7-8 kHz subbands offer the most discriminative informa-
tion.
To sum up, previous studies indicate that certain frequency
subbands are potentially more informative to the detection of
spoofing attacks, even though no standardized approach how
that unevenly distributed information across the frequency axis
should be utilized. Our current work is different from prior
works [19, 20, 21, 22, 23] because most of them aim at hand-
crafting or learning features [24] based on the relevance of spe-
cific subbands for spoofing detection. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no work in spoofing detection aiming to learn
band-specific features by discriminatively training CNNs on a
spectrogram input. This is one of the objectives of this paper.
3. Proposed methodology
Convolutional neural network (CNN) based countermeasure
models trained using spectrograms have shown state-of-the-art
performance in spoofing detection tasks in the ASVspoof 2017
challenge. They are usually trained using the fullband spectrum
of the input signal and use a fixed-duration input representa-
tion [25]. This conventional approach of building CNN-based
countermeasures is illustrated in Figure 1 (a). As the CNN is
trained discriminatively, it is forced to learn discriminative fea-
tures using the entire frequency spectrum of the input signal,
using a single worker to extract usable information across all
the frequency subbands for spoofing attack detection.
But as the prior studies (Section 2) suggest, not all the
subbands are necessarily equally informative. From a model-
ing perspective, the raw spectrogram patch (extracted by stack-
ing multiple frames using all the frequency bands) is a high-
dimensional vector, with strong correlations between any neigh-
boring time (frame) or frequency (DFT bin) indices. As such
low-level redundancy is common to both human and spoofed
samples, it does not necessarily help in the discrimination (clas-
sification) task itself; instead, the model will have to learn both
data compression (suppressing statistical redundancy to a useful
intermediate representation) and classification tasks. This may
also result in additional computational time during convolution
operations.
Therefore, rather than having a single CNN that merges in-
formation across different frequency bands, we propose to in-
corporate a bank of n different CNNs, each operating on non-
overlapping n frequency subbands. Our proposed methodology
is illustrated in Figure 1 (b). Each of the subband CNNs now
has to model a much lower-dimensional subspace, producing a
less redundant and more relevant representation of its respec-
tive subband. Note that the subband representations are after-
wards re-combined through concatenation. This new represen-
tation now contains again information across the full frequency
band, allowing any subsequent model to exploit possibly useful
band-level correlations. In our case, we use a simple feedfor-
ward neural network (FFNN) for the final classification. Natu-
ral questions that arise now are how to perform the frequency-
domain split and how to choose n. We address three different
forms of splits, n = 2, n = 4 and n = 8, and go for the easiest
choice of uniform frequency division.
This choice is motivated from [23]. They divide the orig-
inal spectrogram into n uniform subbands with bandwidth 1
kHz corresponding to n = 8 splits and 0.5 kHz bandwidth for
n = 16 splits. They remove one subband at a time and hand-
craft features from the remaining subbands. GMMs are then
trained on these features for spoofing detection and the perfor-
mance is evaluated in terms of EER on the ASVspoof 2017 eval-
uation sets. As our dataset consists of 16 kHz audio (Nyquist
range 8 kHz), our three choices correspond to subbands of band-
widths 4 kHz (n = 2), 2 kHz (n = 4) and 1 kHz (n = 8). It
should be noted that the default case n = 1 corresponds to the
baseline CNN (Figure 1 a), i.e the model trained on the fullband
spectrogram. From hereon we use “CNN” to refer to the base-
line CNN. And, we use “sub-CNN” to refer to models trained
on the subband spectrograms.
We operate on power spectrograms instead of other alterna-
tive time-frequency representations, following findings in [25].
All our sub-CNNs use the architecture described in [26], which
is an adapted version of the best performing model [25] in the
ASVspoof 2017 challenge. It consists of 9 convolutional layers,
5 max-pooling layers and 2 fully connected (FC) layers. The
key difference while training such sub-CNNs is in terms of the
input they receive. The bandwidth of the input sub-spectrogram
varies depending upon different values of n (number of splits).
Section 4 provides more details regarding input representations,
training and testing of these models.
The proposed joint sub-CNN model of Figure 1 (b) sec-
ond row uses the same architecture as in sub-CNNs (first row
of the same figure) with the following updates: (1) there is no
output layer now, and (2) a concatenation layer is added that
merges the fully-connected (FC) layer output from n sub-CNN
models producing a 32 × n dimensional vector. It should be
noted that the choice of 32 units in the FC layer comes from
the baseline CNN of Figure 1 (a). Furthermore, this architec-
ture with 32 FC units has shown promising results as described
in [26]. Next, the concatenated vector is fed to a feedforward
neural network (FFNN) for class discrimination. The FFNN
consists of two fully-connected layers with 256 and 128 units.
This is followed by a single unit output layer with sigmoid non
linearity for class discrimination. We apply batch normalisa-
tion before applying ReLU non-linearity to these layers. The
architecture of the FFNN is optimised through model valida-
tion (on the development set). Training and optimisation of our
proposed framework is done in two steps:
• First, the input spectrogram is split into n non-
overlapping sub-spectrograms and n sub-CNNs are
trained independently on them. The training dataset is
used for model training and the development dataset is
used for model validation. This step is depicted in the
top row of Figure 1(b).
• Second, the pretrained sub-CNNs (excluding the last
layer) are used to initialise the weights of the sub-CNN
modules of our joint sub-CNN framework shown in the
bottom row of Figure 1 (b). The weights of the FFNN
layers are initialised randomly using xavier initialization
[27]. The biases are initialised to zero. Given an in-
put spectrogram, the framework first splits it into n non-
overlapping sub-spectrograms which are processed by n
sub-CNNs and the whole network parameters are jointly
updated during backpropagation. This step can be inter-
preted as fine-tuning of the subband CNNs and the clas-
sifier back-end jointly for best performance. As in the
earlier step, model parameters are trained on the training
dataset and the development set is used for model vali-
dation.
Our proposed work is different from prior works [19, 20,
21, 22, 23] because most of them aim at hand-crafting or learn-
ing features [24] based on the relevance of specific subbands
for spoofing detection. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no work in spoofing detection aiming to learn band-specific fea-
tures by discriminatively training CNNs on a spectrogram input.
4. Experimental setup
Here we describe our experimental setup including the details
of dataset used, model architecture, training and scoring proce-
dures and also the evaluation measures.
4.1. Dataset
We use two publicly available spoofing datasets, ASVspoof
2017 v2.0 [28] and ASVspoof 2019 physical access (PA), [7]
for model training and testing. In addition, we also include re-
sults on the recently released ASVspoof2019 real PA dataset1
for the challenging case of cross-database performance evalu-
ation. All the datasets are representative of replay attacks and
are complementary to each other.
The ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset consists of bonafide and
spoof class audio recordings grouped into three subsets: train-
ing, development and evaluation [6, 28]. It contains male speak-
ers only: 10, 8 and 24 in the training, development and evalua-
tion sets, respectively. The training set contains a balanced set
of audio files, 1507 for both bonafide and spoof classes. The
development set has 760 bonafide and 950 spoof files. The
evaluation set has 1298 bonafide and 12008 spoof audio files
[28].
The ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset, in turn, consists of 8 male
and 12 female speakers in the training and development subsets.
Both the training and development sets have 5, 400 bonafide
utterances, while 48, 600 and 24, 300 spoofed utterances are
included in the training and development sets, respectively. The
evaluation set has 135, 000 test utterances [7, 29]. Following
our prior findings [30] on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset, we adopt
a custom, but publicly available protocol2.
While the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset was created using
simulated replay attacks, the ASVspoof2019 real PA dataset
consists of audio recordings developed under real replay con-
ditions. We use this last data to evaluate our models (trained
using ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 PA data) to gauge cross-dataset
1https://www.asvspoof.org/database
2https://github.com/BhusanChettri/ASVspoof2019
performance. The real PA dataset consists of 2700 audio files
with 540 bonafide and 2160 spoof recordings [7].
4.2. Input representation and preprocessing
The input to the network is a mean-variance normalized log
power spectrogram of 3 seconds. This normalisation, motivated
from [25], is performed at the utterance-level to standardize the
features (zero mean and unit variance for all frequency bins)
within a given recording. We use a 512-point fast Fourier trans-
form (FFT), and a 32 ms window with a hop of 10 ms. There-
fore, the original input spectrogram has a shape of 300 × 257,
where 300 is the number of frames and 257 the number of FFT
bins. To obtain a consistent input representation we replicate the
audio samples (in the time domain) if the duration is smaller, or
truncate the samples to 3 seconds duration. When n = 1, the
input shape to the baseline CNN remains the same (300× 257)
however it varies for sub-CNNs depending upon different splits
we use. For example, when n = 2, the input shape becomes
300 × 128 and 300 × 129. We always include the leftover
bin to the last split. Similarly, when n = 4 we have four sub-
spectrograms where the first three will have a shape of 300×64,
and a shape of 300×65 for the last split. Likewise, for n = 8 we
have seven sub-spectrograms of shape 300× 32, and a shape of
300× 33 for the last split.
Following our prior findings [30] on the ASVspoof 2019
PA dataset, we remove zero-valued samples from the start and
end of every audio recording in the dataset. Likewise, on the
ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 dataset, we remove leading and trailing
silence/nonspeech samples following our findings in [26]. For
this, we use our publicly released speech endpoint annotations
[31]. Applying such preprocessing helps the model to avoid
exploiting cues that are actually not relevant to the problem,
rather this forces the models to now learn relevant factors in
replay spoofing detection.
4.3. Model training and testing
We train the network to optimize the binary cross entropy loss
between a bonafide and a spoof class. We use a batch size of
32 and learning rate of 1e−4. We use the ADAM [32] optimizer
with default parameters. We apply a dropout of 50% to the in-
put of the fully connected layers. If the validation loss does not
improve for 5 epochs we stop the training process to avoid over-
fitting. We train models for a maximum of 100 training epochs.
Using this approach we train 5 models with random initialisa-
tion. We choose the model showing the best performance on the
development set and use it to test the performance on the eval-
uation set. At test time, for each audio spectrogram we use the
model output — the bonafide-class posterior probability — as
our detection score. The approach described above is the same
for all our models.
4.4. Performance evaluation
We assess the performance of different countermeasure mod-
els using two different metrics. The first one gauges the abil-
ity of the countermeasure to discriminate bonafide and spoofed
utterances from each other. It is measured through the equal
error rate (EER), which was the primary evaluation metric of
the ASVspoof 2017 challenge, and a secondary metric of the
ASVspoof 2019 challenge. EER is the error rate at an operating
point where the false acceptance (false alarm) and false rejec-
tion (miss) rates are equal. A reference value of 50% indicates
the chance level. Our second metric is minimum normalized
Table 1: Performance of the baselines.
Baseline Subbands ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019(kHz) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
CNN 0-8 0.3873 13.02 0.2019 7.00
GMM 0-8 0.5054 18.33 0.9928 59.12
Table 2: Performance of sub-CNNs M1, M2 and joint model J1.
Bold indicates the best performance.
Model Subbands ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019(kHz) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
M1 0-4 0.7045 33.03 0.1925 6.97
M2 4-8 0.4800 18.95 0.5201 19.69
J1 - 0.2893 10.63 0.1864 6.44
tandem detection cost function (t-DCF) [33] metric that evalu-
ates both countermeasure and ASV system as a whole. We use
the evaluation scripts and the ASV scores (x-vector recognizer)
released by the organisers. A reference value 1.00 of (normal-
ized) t-DCF indicates an uninformative countermeasure.
5. Experiments and results
We now describe different experimental studies along with the
results in this section.
Baselines. To assess the performance of our proposed frame-
work we train a baseline CNN model (Figure 1(a)) using a full-
band spectrogram. For completeness, we also train and test a
CQCC-based GMM model so as to compare it with our pro-
posed framework. It should be noted that due to the preprocess-
ing applied on the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 PA datasets during
training and testing, our baselines are different from the official
ones [28, 7]; therefore, the numbers reported here should not
be directly compared with the results of ASVspoof challenges.
Table 1 summarises the results.
On the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 we use the same parameterisa-
tion as in [28] to train the GMM model. On the evaluation set,
the GMM model reaches EER = 18.33% and t-DCF = 0.5054.
On the ASVspoof 2019 PA3 evaluation set EER = 59.12% and t-
DCF = 0.9928. The results suggest that GMM models become
less confident in making classification decisions when silence
cues are removed during training and testing. Refer to [30] for
more details. On both datasets, the CNN baseline outperforms
the GMM on both metrics. This demonstrates its effectiveness
on learning relevant features useful for discrimination despite
the preprocessing applied on the audio signals in contrast to
hand-crafted CQCC features used in the GMM.
5.1. Experiment 1: subband modeling
We design four experimental setups for different values of n us-
ing our proposed methodology. We use n = 2 in our first setup.
Using the architecture and training methodology described ear-
lier we train two independent sub-CNNs M1 and M2. M1 op-
erates on the first 4 kHz and M2 on the last 4 kHz subband
spectrograms. Next, we use them (except the last output layer)
to initialise the respective sub-CNN module weights of our joint
sub-CNN model framework as shown in the bottom row of Fig-
3We used the pretrained GMM model from our prior work [30] to
test on the evaluation set.
Table 3: Performance of sub-CNNs M3 through M6 and joint
model J2. Bold indicates the best performance.
Model Subbands ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019(kHz) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
M3 0-2 0.6172 31.20 0.2265 7.97
M4 2-4 0.9773 41.58 0.4568 17.72
M5 4-6 0.9995 50.70 0.5903 23.16
M6 6-8 0.5032 23.50 0.6019 23.59
J2 - 0.3343 11.78 0.1977 6.99
ure 1(b). We call this joint model J1. Our second setup uses
n = 4. Therefore, we train four independent sub-CNNs M3
through M6 on 2 kHz subband spectrograms. We then use these
pretrained models to initialise the weights of sub-CNN modules
of our joint model J2. Our final setup uses n = 8. We now train
eight independent sub-CNNs M7 through M14 operating on 1
kHz subband spectrograms. We then use them (except the last
layer weights) to initialise our joint model J3 shown in Figure
1(b) bottom row.
Finally, motivated from the results of sub-CNNs M7 and
M14 on the ASVspoof 2017 dataset (shown in Table 4) we de-
sign a joint model J4 operating on the first and the last 1 kHz
subband spectrograms. This setup is different from the previous
setups as more than half of the information is being discarded
here. Overall J4 utilises only 2 kHz of information (the first
and last 1 kHz bands). As in the earlier setups, the pretrained
weights (here M7 and M14 models) are used to initialise the
weights of sub-CNN modules of our joint model J4. It should
be noted that the entire model parameters are jointly optimised
while training J1, J2, J3 and J4. We perform these experiments
on both the ASVspoof 2017 v2.0 and 2019 PA datasets.
Table 2 summarises the performance of our individual sub-
CNNs M1, M2 and the joint model J1. On the ASVspoof
2017 dataset, the higher frequency bands (4 − 8 kHz) seem
to carry more discriminative information than the lower bands
(0 − 4 kHz). However, we observe the opposite pattern on
the ASVspoof 2019 dataset where M1 trained on 0 − 4 kHz
shows better results than M2. This might be due to differences
in dataset design (real vs. simulated replay) and compilation
(different speakers and audio qualities of the source corpora).
Nonetheless, on both the datasets our proposed joint model J1
outperforms M1, M2 and the baselines by a large margin on
both performance metrics. This demonstrates the effectiveness
of our proposed approach for spoofing attack detection.
Next we discuss the performance of sub-CNNs M3 through
M6 and the joint model J2. Table 3 summarises this. Overall,
the individual sub-CNNs now show poor performance, which
is expected as each of them now receives only half of the in-
formation as the previous case (n = 2). Nonetheless, the
proposed model J2 that merges information from all the bands
again outperforms the fullband baselines (CNN and GMM) and
sub-CNNs M3 through M6.
Table 4 summarises the performance of our individual sub-
CNNs M7 through M14 and joint models J3 and J4. These re-
sults provide deeper insights in understanding the influence of
different subbands for spoofing detection. As in the previous
two setups (n = 2 and n = 4), our joint model J3 shows better
results than training individual sub-CNNs indicating that joint
training offers some form of complementary information across
different frequency bands. We also find that on the ASVspoof
2017 dataset, M14 trained on the last 7 − 8 kHz band outper-
Table 4: Performance of sub-CNNs M7 through M14 and joint
models J3 and J4. Bold indicates the best performance.
Model Subbands ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019(kHz) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
M7 0-1 0.6216 31.59 0.2354 8.48
M8 1-2 0.9977 48.92 0.6557 25.15
M9 2-3 0.9971 50.61 0.7327 28.60
M10 3-4 0.9969 49.85 0.5390 21.60
M11 4-5 0.9992 44.06 0.6605 25.69
M12 5-6 0.9914 45.05 0.7118 28.34
M13 6-7 0.9817 42.23 0.7123 28.17
M14 7-8 0.4747 18.10 0.7231 28.01
J3 - 0.2734 11.02 0.1975 7.34
J4 - 0.2771 10.40 0.2238 8.30
Table 5: Score-level fusion results. LS: linear sum of scores.
WLS: weighted sum of scores.
Model Fusion ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019(type) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
F1 LS 0.3208 11.86 0.2208 7.50
F2 WLS 0.3189 11.72 0.2034 6.78
F3 LS 0.6151 24.25 0.2197 8.00
F4 WLS 0.3079 11.55 0.1898 6.95
F5 LS 0.4932 18.25 0.2626 9.78
F6 WLS 0.3548 12.33 0.1848 6.99
forms all other sub-CNNs by a large margin. This is followed
by M7 (operating on the 0 − 1 kHz band) that also performs
substantially better than the remaining sub-CNNs. Inspired by
this finding, we further train another joint model J4 trained only
with the lowest and highest sub-CNNs. Interestingly, this highly
reduced model yields the best performance on the ASVspoof
2017 dataset, matching with the findings reported on the version
1.0 dataset by [23]. However, on the ASVspoof 2019 dataset,
the first 1 kHz subband appears to carry most relevant infor-
mation as opposed to other subbands. Furthermore, the results
found for the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 dataset do not match
completely with the main differences being in dataset design
and collection — the two datasets ASVspoof 2017 and 2019
PA are designed and collected differently.
5.2. Experiment 2: score fusion
We perform fusion experiments to understand if combining in-
formation through score-level fusion helps improve detection
performance. In this setting we use the scores from each of the
pretrained sub-CNNs and combine their scores using two sim-
ple approaches: linear sum of scores (LS), and linear weighted
sum of scores (WLS). Let S1, S2, S3, ..., Sn represent scores
from n sub-CNNs for a test utterance X . The fused score using
the two approaches is obtained as: linear sum = S1+S2+S3+
..+Sn and weighted sum = w1 ∗S1+w2 ∗S2+w3 ∗S3+ ..+
wn ∗Sn where w1, w2, w3, ..., wn are weights corresponding to
each sub-CNN score learned using logistic regression (LR). We
use the Bosaris toolkit [34] for the LR implementation. We per-
form six different fusion experiments: F1 - F6. F1 uses linear
sum fusion on the M1 and M2 model scores, F2 on the other
hand uses weighted linear fusion on them. F3 uses linear sum
fusion on the scores of the models M3 through M6, F4 on the
other hand uses weighted linear fusion on them. F5 uses linear
sum fusion on the scores of the models M7 through M14, F6 on
Table 6: Cross-dataset performance evaluation on the 2019 PA
real testset. D1: ASVspoof 2017 v2.0, D2: ASVspoof 2019 PA.
Model Subbands Trained on D1 Trained on D2(kHz) t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
CNN 0-8 0.9986 41.29 0.6374 34.25
M1 0-4 0.8205 44.81 0.6800 33.12
M2 4-8 0.9687 42.59 0.7820 39.44
J1 - 0.9939 44.07 0.6741 35.92
M3 0-2 0.8984 38.33 0.6760 33.49
M4 2-4 0.8025 46.08 0.7311 34.62
M5 4-6 0.9995 59.44 0.8033 35.74
M6 6-8 0.9976 51.85 0.6877 28.37
J2 - 0.9944 40.55 0.6544 30.18
M7 0-1 0.8508 34.81 0.6678 34.95
M8 1-2 0.9875 47.63 1.0 51.29
M9 2-3 0.9545 51.48 0.8014 32.22
M10 3-4 0.9634 42.22 0.8553 35.41
M11 4-5 0.9003 43.33 0.7524 32.80
M12 5-6 0.9788 47.03 0.8322 38.65
M13 6-7 0.9828 48.49 0.7038 28.70
M14 7-8 0.9981 42.38 0.6483 27.22
J3 - 0.9208 37.61 0.6439 30.97
J4 - 0.9081 36.62 0.7541 36.71
the contrary applies weighted linear fusion on them.
Table 5 summarises the results. In general, WLS fusion
shows better performance than LS fusion, outperforming the
baselines. However they show poor (or similar) performance
compared to our joint subband modeling framework. For ex-
ample, on the ASVspoof 2017 evaluation set the joint model J4
(Table 4) shows better results in comparison to all our fusion
models. Similarly, on the ASVspoof 2019 PA evaluation set the
joint model J1 (Table 2) shows better EER (and slightly worse
t-DCF). As expected, combining information through score-
fusion techniques offers gains in detection performance. How-
ever, our proposed joint subband modelling framework shows
better results over score-fusion approaches. This further con-
firms that the complementary information provided by individ-
ual sub-CNNs helps improve overall detection performance.
5.3. Experiment 3 - cross-database evaluation
The goal of our final experiment is to understand the gener-
alisability of our subband specific models (M1 through M11)
and joint subband models (J1, J2, J3 and J4) in cross-database
evaluation. We take all our pretrained models trained on the
ASVspoof 2017 and ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset and evaluate
their performance on the ASVspoof 2019 real PA test set. Table
6 shows the results.
While our models show good performance on the respective
evaluation sets (see Tables 2, 3, 4), they fail to generalise well
on the unseen real replay attack conditions of the ASVspoof
2019 real PA test set. On both the t-DCF and EER we observe
high error rates for our joint models (J1, J2, J3 and J4). This also
indicates overfitting on the respective dataset and lack of gener-
alisability in unseen attack conditions. One possible interpreta-
tion to this observation may be attributed to dataset design and
collection for the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 PA datasets. It is
worth noting that the ASVspoof 2019 PA dataset was developed
through controlled simulation while the ASVspoof 2017 dataset
was collected in real world recording and replay conditions.
Due to the dataset issues [26, 30] identified on both ASVspoof
Table 7: Summary of results showing the comparison of base-
lines with our proposed models. * results taken from Table 1.
Model ASVspoof 2017 ASVspoof 2019t-DCF EER% t-DCF EER%
GMM* 0.5054 18.33 0.9928 59.12
CNN* 0.3873 13.02 0.2019 7.0
J1 0.2893 10.63 0.1864 6.44
J2 0.3343 11.78 0.1977 6.99
J3 0.2734 11.02 0.1975 7.34
J4 0.2771 10.40 0.2238 8.30
2017 and 2019 PA, the models trained on these datasets might
not be able to capture real replay attack conditions and thus per-
form poorly on the real PA test set which has been designed
carefully reflecting real replay attack conditions. This study fur-
ther suggests that there is still need for a reliable replay training
dataset that can be used to train models incorporating real world
replay attack conditions.
6. Discussion and conclusion
In this paper we performed a detailed analysis on the impact of
different subbands and their importance on replay spoofing de-
tection tasks on the benchmark datasets ASVspoof 2017 v2.0
and ASVspoof 2019 PA. Our proposed subband CNN model
outperformed the traditional fullband CNN model, and also the
CQCC-GMM baselines by a large margin, demonstrating the
significance of our approach. We also investigated how com-
bining information at the score level from each subband CNNs
compared with our joint subband modelling framework. The fi-
nal set of studies we performed here is on cross-database evalu-
ation to investigate the generalisability of replay spoofing coun-
termeasures on the ASVspoof 2019 real PA dataset.
Table 7 provides a summary of our main findings on both
the ASVspoof 2017 and 2019 PA datasets. Performance im-
provement obtained using our proposed approach over baslines
are very promising, encouraging further research on subband
modelling for spoofing detection. Furthermore, it should be
noted that our main objective in this paper is not to beat the
best performing models published on the two datasets, but to
validate our hypothesis about subband modelling using CNNs
trained on spectrogram inputs. An important take-home mes-
sage from our study is that while the first and the last 1 kHz
frequency bands offer substantial improvement in detection per-
formance, the same does not hold true for models trained on
ASVspoof 2019. This suggests that the datasets available for
training these models do not reflect real world replay conditions,
suggesting a need for careful design of datasets for training re-
play spoofing countermeasures.
As future work, we aim to extend this analysis on
text-to-speech and voice-converted spoofing attacks using the
ASVspoof 2015 and ASVspoof 2019 logical access spoofing
datasets. Use of advanced backend classifiers (current work
uses a simple feed forward neural network) in our joint subband
modelling framework will also be investigated. Furthermore,
we are also interested in investigating the design and implemen-
tation of a unified countermeasure model that can be used for
any spoofing attack conditions.
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